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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

this statement it may be inferred that Bull v. United States is still good law but
that the Supreme Court will not expand the doctrine beyond what the facts of
that case warrant. The Court mentions the McEachern case only incidentally,
by pointing out that it seemed to direct a result for the Collector. Consequently,
so far as tax matters are concerned, in order for a barred claim to be allowed as
a recoupment against an adverse claim which is not barred, the fact situation
must conform to either the Lewis v. Reynolds case or to the Bull v. United States

case. The test to be applied in the Lewis case would be whether the main claim
arose in the same tax year as the recoupment claim. The test to be applied under
Bull v. United States is whether the main claim arose out of the same transaction

as the recoupment claim, and this requirement must be strictly construed according to the instant case. If the fact situation will not fit either test outlined above,
recoupment will probably be denied.
CHESTER S. JONES

FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT AS A TAKING OF PROPERTY

Plaintiff was the owner of a chicken farm in North Carolina situated near
an airport which was leased by the United States in June, 1942, for the duration of the national emergency. Constant landing and taking off of military
planes flying at low altitudes! over plaintiff's farm caused a decrease in production, and frequently chickens became frightened to the extent that they would
fly against buildings and were killed. As a result plaintiff was forced to abandon
the chicken business. He brought an action against the United States in the Court
of Claims alleging an appropriation of his property, and recovered a judgment. 2
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court held, by a six to two decision,
that a servitude had been imposed upon the land, and that there had been a taking
of property within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution. United States v. Causby, (1946) 328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062,
90 L. Ed. 971.
This was the first case in which any court had held that the noise and glare
of low flying aircraft would constitute a taking of property. Regarding the
ancient common law maxium, cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, meaning

literally that surface ownership extends vertically to the heavens, the court
stated that the doctrine had no place in our modern world,3 although the landowner's property right in superadjacent airspace is well recognized when inter1. Following the 30-1 glide angle, which means one foot of elevation for every thirty
feet of horizontal distance, the planes passed over the complainants property at an
average altitude of 83 feet. This was only 67 feet above the house and 63 feet above
the barn.
2. Causby v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 751 (The court awarded damages to the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00, or one half the total value of the plaintiff's property).
3. United States v. Causby, (1946) 328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 1065, 90 L. Ed. 971.
(The decision of the Court of Claims was reversed because it was not clear whether
the easement taken was temporary or permanent and consequently the Supreme Court
did not determine whether or not the award of damages was proper).

RECENT CASES

ference by others hinders his current use and enjoyment of the property below.4

The Supreme Court had previously held that where United States coastal defense batteries had fired projectiles over private property, there had been a taking. 5 In the instant case the court relied heavily on this previous decision and

reasoned that using the airspace close to the surface would tend to "limit the
utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value", 6 and that the damage

would be direct and not merely consequential. The theory of the previous decision is that the flight of an object over private property is, in itself, a taking.
On the other hand, the theory in the instant case appears to be that it is not
the flights alone, but rather the resulting noise and glare that constitutes the taking. Other cases have held that where the use of property is merely restricted
it may constitute a taking for which the owner should be compensated. 7 The
instant case shows this to be true even though only an easement of flight has been
taken and the consequence of its use has resulted in the damage. A recent case held
that a taking existed where the government condemned the occupancy of a leased
warehouse and in the dismantling process certain fixtures and permanent equipment depreciated in value or were destroyed.8 However, to constitute a taking
there need not be an actual physical invasion of the property, 9 and compensation
must be paid for any direct physical disturbance which interferes with the owner's
use of his property.10
This decision gives rise to a new remedy for property owners claiming recurrent interference from aircraft operation. Prior decisions on this question
4. See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc. (1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385,
69 A.L.R. 300 (Where the court assumed that the landowner had property rights to
superadjacent airspace to the extent necessary for developing the underlying land).
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 201, 203, 83
A.L.R. 319, 325 (Where the court said that property rights in the airspace must
be determined, "in relation to the necessities of the period.") Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta (1934) 178 Ga. 514, 529, 173 S.E. 817, 825; Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.

v. Dunlop (1933) 148 Misc. Rep. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469.
5. Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United States (1922)
6.

Sup. Ct. 135, 67 L. Ed 287.
United States v. Causby (1946)

260 U.S. 327, 43

328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 1066, 90 L. Ed. 971.

7. Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166 (U.S. 1872), 20
L. Ed. 557 (Held, "Where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions
of water, earth, sand or other material, or by having an artificial structure placed
on it, so as to effectively destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking," and compensation must be allowed.) United States v. Lynah (1902) 188 U.S. 445, 23 Sup.
Ct. 349, 47 L. Ed. 539 (Held, where the value of the lands of an individual were
substantially destroyed there was a taking and compensation was allowed.)
8. United States v. General Motors Corp. (1945) 323 U.S. 373, 65 Sup. Ct. 357, 89
L. Ed. 311 (where the court held that property in an accurate sense denotes the
owners right to possess, use, or dispose of his interest in the property, and that destruction was tantamount to taking.)
9. In re Sansom Street of Philadelphia (1928) 293 Pa. 483, 143 Atl. 134 (making it
impossible for a property owner to build or improve his property.) Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark (1945) 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A. (2d) 559 (restricting
height of structures placed upon property.)
10. Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. Rhein (1938) 369 I11.584, 17 N.E. (2d) 582 (where company placed structures on only small portion of the owners land but farming was
made inconvenient on the entire tract.) State v. Ahaus (1945) 223 Ind. 629, 63 N.E.
(2d) 199 (where a road improvement project caused surface water to flow onto
lands other than those condemned.
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have invariably involved private individuals and were actions in tort for trespass,)1 or nuisance, 12 or for injunctive relief against such torts.13
The dissenting justices, Black, J. and Burton, J., were of the opinion that
the effect of this decision would be to impose new constitutional barriers upon
legislation and regulation pertaining to air commerce, that the old concepts of
private ownership of land should not be introduced into the field of air regulation, and that the allegations of noise and glare relied on by the complaint constituted, at best, an action in tort.
The transitory period that followed the introduction of the automobile and
the train caused similar difficulties. Domestic animals were frightened at the
sight and the sound of the new machines. The airplane is now as much a part of
our modern world as either the train or the automobile, and it is believed that
fowls will eventually become accustomed to planes in the same manner that
domestic animals have become accustomed to other machines.
Since the United States had not given its consent to be sued in tort the complainant based his claim on the constitutional ground of taking of property.
However, since this decision has been handed down, Congress has passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act14 which allows actions against the government without its consent where claims are made on account of damage to or loss of property
caused by the acts of government employees acting within the scope of their
employment.

In view of these premises, since the landowner has not been wholly excluded
from the use and enjoyment of his land, and since it is the consequence of the
object in flight that has caused the damage, it would seem that granting relief
on this constitutional ground may have been premature.
J. L. THORPE

RESTRICTION ON EMPLOYEE'S USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

GAINED DURING COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Plaintiff spent $240,000.00 on exploration and geological surveys of a portion of Oklahoma, to obtain information which was regarded as confidential.
Defendant had been employed as a geologist by plaintiff to help acquire this
knowledge, and subsequent to his employment defendant disseminated the information to the general public and plaintiff's competitors. In an action to stop
11. Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel Co. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 411, U.S.
Av. R. 15; (1938) Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Co. (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84
F. (2d) 755, Cert. denied (1936) 300 U.S. 654, 57 Sup. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865; Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co. (1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300;
Burnham v. Beverly Airways (1942) 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575.
12. People v. Dycer Flying Service (1939) U.S. Av. R. 21; Vanderslaice v. Shawn (Del.
Ch. 1942) 27 A. (2d) 87.
13. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 201, 83 A.L.R.
319; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey (1942) 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. (2d) 245; Burham v.
Beverly Airways Inc. (1942) 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575; Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta, (1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817, 99 A.L.R. 158.
14. Chap. 753, Public Law 601, Title IV, United States Code, Congressional Service
(1946).

